Divergence between knowledge and action

“The crises of our time have something to do with the fact that we are not acting on what we know,” Voss summed up his key assertion. Although we know a great deal and have the technical and economic means at our disposal to create a better world, we fall far short of putting this knowledge into practice and instead stagger from one crisis to the next. One example of this is the “panic myth”: When a crisis develops, information is supposedly withheld by politicians, according to this theory, because they are worried that it would tend to generate insecurity among the population and thus lead to panic, which would put people at risk. However, the notion that people in situations of disaster fundamentally react in panic has been clearly refuted by numerous empirical studies on human behavior in extreme situations (accidents, earthquakes or wars) ever since the 1940s. Rather, most people behave rationally and helpfully towards others and organize themselves to overcome a crisis.

Real cases of mass panic, such as the Love Parade disaster in Duisburg in 2010, show that all such disasters are triggered by highly specific conditions, which have been very well researched and are identifiable. “But there are no reports from Western countries that mere information or a warning of a possible danger has led to actual harm to life and limb,” Voss emphasized. On the contrary: Withholding information only serves to increase insecurity, especially in times of crisis when people are eagerly searching for information. One consequence of this, he continued, is dwindling trust in the authorities and growing skepticism towards state institutions.

The differentiated society

There are structural reasons, said Voss, why people do not act on what they know. He explained this using a theory of sociologist Niklas Luhmann, who regarded modern society as consisting of various largely self-sufficient functional systems such as the economy, politics, science, media and law. This specialization has its advantages: More goods can be produced, for example, or more information processed. “But if everyone just does what they can do the best without taking a look at their surroundings, gaps will arise over the course of decades. When people no longer feel committed to a unifying morality, or to norms and values, the very fabric of society will tear apart sooner or later.”

The example of the panic myth demonstrates that knowledge does not lead directly to the correct consequences for action, if to any at all. Possible solutions must fit into the structurally existing systemic logic of a functionally differentiated society, whereas solutions that require structural changes have practically no chance of success. “The panic myth is essentially functional for the self-understanding of state institutions. It allows them to decide what knowledge must remain secret. The argument that further information would merely serve to unsettle the population can serve to conceal failure on the part of the state,” said Voss.

Disasters in the perspective of sociology

Voss referred to the sociologist Lars Clausen, to date the only author of a sociological theory of disaster. Clausen points out that when considering disasters, it is easy to overlook important factors and then to think in the wrong direction. Collective failure, and thus disaster, cannot be attributed to floodwaters, for example, because nature knows no disasters. “The causes of this collective failure lie in society, such as when it only looks for quick answers,” Voss emphasized. The German federal government’s cross-state, interdepartmental crisis management exercises (LÜKEX), for instance, are designed to prevent absolute limits being reached. But an exercise should do just this, in order to expose weak points. For Clausen, this defense mechanism of not exceeding limitations is a key factor in the development of disasters, explained Voss: “A disaster takes its course when a society ceases to look everywhere and narrows the horizon of impending dangers.”

The factors discussed by sociologist Ulrich Beck in his 1986 book “Risk Society” tend to exacerbate this narrowing of perspectives. According to Beck, modern societies are increasingly subject to risks they generate themselves, which have a profound impact on social, political and economic structures to the extent that all dangers we have previously known pale in comparison. Risks such as environmental pollution, nuclear accidents or climate change have global effects, says Beck, which are only felt in other places or in some cases only much later. Following on from Beck’s assertion that the political institutions and mechanisms established after the Second World War are not sufficient to deal with global risks, Voss emphasized the necessity of taking an integrated view of the complex interaction of all these crisis-ridden processes.

Proposal for a solution

Voss illustrated this with an imaginary scenario: “I envisage a very large building under the roof of which scientists from all disciplines relevant to critical processes work towards solving systemic social problems: experts with practical experience, along with representatives of NGOs, associations, initiatives, social movements, interest groups and foundations.” Important here are long-term cooperation and the training of one’s own up-and-coming staff, who will think in interdisciplinary terms from the outset. Among other things, they would develop scenarios and shape future developments: What could a Germany worth living in look like in 2050?

These people would join forces in doing what has been done to date in countless individual pockets of society, but has not been brought together and unified. Independence from direct competitive and exploitative interests on the part of academia and the economic sphere makes for open dialogue and opens people’s eyes to the actual complexity of the challenge. This all creates trust, said Voss – and is of utmost importance in times when the confidence placed in authorities, and in anyone who is somehow suspected of acting on behalf of the state, is strategically undermined. “Could bridges be built between the various social spheres by means of such external impulses from civil society? Could this bring about a structural transformation towards a more resilient society?” With these open questions Voss concluded his lecture.